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NOTES & COMMENTS
Minority Inclusion without Race-Based Affirmative
Action: An Embodiment of Justice Powell's Vision
"There is nothing wrong with diversity when it occurs without
discrimination, but there is everything wrong with using dis-
crimination to achieve diversity."'
INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Rutgers Law School-Newark implemented an unprec-
edented admissions program that allows for the recruitment of mi-
norities, yet is able to circumvent the recent wave of reverse
discrimination lawsuits that have plagued other schools in the
United States.2 The Law School has accomplished this objective by
eliminating the "overtly race-based criteria" of the old admissions
program.3 The new admissions program permits recruitment of stu-
dents by focusing on their overcoming of economic and educational
hardships. 4 School administration officials at Rutgers Law School-
Newark are reportedly confident that this new admissions program
may have finally resolved more than twenty years of ambiguities in
affirmative action decisions at state universities throughout this
country. 5 The struggle to resolve affirmative action in universities
commenced with the United States Supreme Court decision in Uni-
1 See Roger Clegg, Less Preferred: The Legal Establishment's Embrace of
'Diversity' Amounts to Little More Than a Willingness to Racially Discriminate, 159
N.J.L.J. 407 (Jan. 31, 2000).
2 See Henry Gottlieb, How to Save Affirmative Action, 160 N.J.L.J. 1095
(June 15, 2000) (describing the reasons for and the basis behind the new admis-
sions program at Rutgers Law School-Newark).
3 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAw-NEWARK CATALOG
28 (2000-2002) ("Admission to the school with inclusion in Minority Student Pro-
gram is based primarily on educational and employment experiences, personal and
academic accomplishments, community service, socioeconomic background, and
extraordinary family circumstances, with less though still significant, emphasis on
the LSAT and UGPA.").
4 Id. ("The MSP is available, regardless of race or ethnic origin, to disadvan-
taged applicants.").
5 See Gottlieb, supra note 2 ("[Dean Stuart] Deutsch has reason to be confi-
dent in his new system.").
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versity of California Regents v. Bakke.6 The ambiguity of Justice
Powell's reasoning has led to an unsettled and wide range of judicial
interpretations by the lower courts.7 Recently, the Circuit courts
have been left to resolve the uncertainty of the Bakke decision in
the wake of several reverse discrimination lawsuits.8 As the courts
continue to move toward a universal and balanced interpretation of
Bakke, states have begun to take measures to prohibit affirmative
action, effectively outlawing any unconstitutional preferences for
minorities in state institutions.9 With this in mind, Rutgers Law
School-Newark believes that its innovative admissions program has
achieved the vision that Justice Powell sought-that minorities
would be admitted to universities, not solely based on race. This
vision emphasized that "[e]thnic diversity, however, is only one ele-
ment in a range of factors a university may properly consider in
attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body." 10
This Note focuses on how the new admissions system at
Rutgers Law School-Newark has resolved the affirmative action
problem that has plagued state universities since the 1970s.'1 Part I,
trace the existence of the affirmative action problem to the Four-
teenth Amendment and Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.12 Moreover, Part I examines the judicial interpretations and
applications of these clauses as the nation sought to remedy the
problems that minorities faced. 13 Part II explores how the U.S. Su-
preme Court, in its landmark decision in Bakke, dealt with the af-
6 See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (In this
decision, Justice Powell left open for interpretation his reasoning in which he held
that racial quota systems violated the law, but that race may be considered in the
admissions process as a "plus" factor.).
7 See Keith J. Bybee, The Political Significance of Legal Ambiguity: The
Case of Affirmative Action, 34 L. & Soc'y REV. 263, 270-271 (2000) ("Without
providing a well-specified justification of what he had done, Powell made it diffi-
cult to forecast what he would do-a result that fostered arbitrary judicial power
and maximized public uncertainty.").
8 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996); Wessman v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790 (1998).
9 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (adopted by voters as Proposition 209,
effective Nov. 6, 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1998) (Initiative Measure
No. 200, approved Nov. 3, 1998).
10 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. ("Ethnic diversity, however, is only one ele-
ment in a range of factors a university may properly consider in attaining the goal
of a heterogeneous student body.").
11 See discussion infra Parts I-IV.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a - 2000h (1982).
13 See discussion infra Part II.
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firmative action problem in the education arena.14 Part III
describes how post-Bakke courts have applied and interpreted Jus-
tice Powell's decision. 15 After Bakke, the Circuit Courts disagreed
as to the correct interpretation and application of the Bakke deci-
sion because of two factors: (1) the ambiguous meaning of Justice
Powell's reasoning, and (2) Justice Powell's decision was not sup-
ported by the majority.16 Part IV discusses the removal of the old
admissions program and the implementation of the new admissions
program at Rutgers Law School-Newark.1 7 Part V examines how
the new admissions system resolves the affirmative action conflict
that has stemmed from the ambiguities of Bakke.18 Finally, this
Note concludes that the new admissions program benefits everyone
that is involved in the admission process. The program allows state
schools to actively recruit minority students rather than facing bans
on all affirmative action. 19
I. THE ROOTS OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
AcT OF 1964
The origin of the affirmative action conflict dates back to 1868,
the year the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and adopted.20 In
response to the Civil War, the abolition of slavery, and the enact-
ment of the "black codes,"' 2' the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment focused on dispelling the common distinc-
tion between the white and black race as to civil rights.22 The
14 See discussion infra Part II.
15 See discussion infra Part III.
16 See Bybee, supra note 7, at 269 ("In some instances, judges have applied
Bakke's rationale directly, weighing the effort to secure diverse student bodies in
the balance of strict scrutiny. In other instances, judges have used Bakke selec-
tively, relying on part of Powell's reasoning while calling into question the rest.").
See, e.g., Wessman, 160 F.3d 790; Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932.
17 See discussion infra Part IV.
18 See Bybee, supra note 7. See also discussion infra Part V.
19 See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
20 U. S. CONST. art. XIV.
21 T.B. Wilson, The Black Codes of the South at http://www.usbol.com/
ctjournal/BlkCodesl.html (visited Feb. 25, 2001) ("The black codes were legal en-
actments governing the behavior and status of blacks in American states before
the 14th Amendment (1868) to the Constitution made such discriminatory legisla-
tion unconstitutional.").
22 See Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection
Of The Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 140 (1950) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th
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equality guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause states, "the law
which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all."'2 3
While the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly articu-
lated their intentions, states chose to proceed in a clearly segrega-
tionist direction for nearly a century. 24 In 1896, the Supreme Court
fostered this notion by issuing their infamous "separate but equal"
decision in Plessy v. Furgeson.25 In Plessy, Justice Harlan, the sole
dissenter, reminded our nation that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment had intended a government and laws that "took no
account of [man's] surroundings or of his color."'26 It wasn't until
the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of Education that the Supreme
Court finally reversed its clearly segregation-based attitude.2 7 In
Brown, the Supreme Court prohibited the use of a race criteria in
assigning children to public schools. 2 8 Fifty-eight years after his
lone dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan's voice of reason was finally
accepted by the Supreme Court.2 9
With these decisions in mind, Congress enacted Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), which prohibited discrimina-
tion based on race, color, or national origin in any federally funded
Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866)) (discussing the original intent of the framers of the
equal protection clause).
23 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866).
24 JOHN E. FLEMING, GERALD R. GILL, & DAVID H. WINTON, The Case for
Blacks in Higher Education 3 (1978) ("Although Congress recognized the legiti-
mate claim of black people to these basic human rights, it was soon evident that
the nation was unwilling to enforce them and thus began the process of reversal.").
25 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy, the petitioner, a Louisiana
resident was asked by the railway conductor to abandon his seat in the "white
only" section and move to the colored section. Plessy was part Caucasian and part
African-American. Upon refusal, he was arrested and convicted under Louisiana
law that provided "for separate railway carriages for white and colored races." Id.
at 538. The court held the law valid under the 14th Amendment and affirmed the
conviction under the "separate but equal" doctrine. Id.
26 Id. at 556 (Justice Harlan, dissenting) ("Our Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens ... The law regards man as
man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color.").
27 347 U.S. 483 (1.954) (Four black minors sought a declaration permitting
them to attend public schools under an integrated system. Their attendance had
been denied based on existing laws that allowed for racial segregation in the public
school system.).
28 Id. (holding that racial segregation of black children in public schools vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment).
29 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 556.
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program.30 In considering the legislative intent of Title VI, it must
be held to prohibit only those racial classifications that would vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment.31 It is clear that the framers of
Title VI intended it to work in conjunction with the Fourteenth
Amendment by specifically prohibiting race discrimination in feder-
ally funded programs. 32 The framers had seen the uncertainty of
the courts in their interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
from 1896 to 1954, and thus, sought to firmly establish the equality
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment through the enactment of
Title VI.33
Congress also sought to eliminate race discrimination from the
workplace by enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII").34 The specific intent of Title VII was to keep an em-
ployer's actions concerning his employee free from race-based mo-
tives.35 As a reaffirmation of the Brown decision and of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII sought to firmly establish the
principle of nondiscrimination in the workplace. 36 In addition, the
Supreme Court effectively restated the nondiscrimination principle
of Title VII just prior to the affirmative action case of Bakke. In
1976, the Supreme Court decided McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964) ("No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Interpretive Note # 5) ("Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which proscribes racial discrimination in any program receiving fed-
eral financial assistance, proscribes only those racial classifications that would vio-
late equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
32 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (The equality guarantee
of the Equal Protection Clause states "[t]he law which operates upon one man
shall operate equally upon all.").
33 See infra note 25 and accompanying text; see infra note 27 and accompa-
nying text (The courts finally established the equality guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment 58 years after deciding Plessy.).
34 110 CONG. REC. 6564 (1964).
35 110 CONG. REC. 5423 (1964). See also Exec. Order No. 10,925 (1961)
(Issued by President Kennedy on March 6, 1961 to establish the President's Com-
mittee on Equal Employment Opportunity, which provided a foundation for "af-
firmative steps" designed "to realize more fully the national policy of
nondiscrimination within the executive branch of the Government." The original
concept of "affirmative steps" was meant to provide individuals of all races with
opportunities to compete on the basis of individual merit. It was specifically de-
signed to counteract any conceptions of preference.).
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
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Transportation Co., a racial discrimination suit brought on the basis
of Title VII.37 Here, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, re-em-
phasized that Title VII applied universally to all people.38
Despite this strong precedent for nondiscrimination based on
race, the Supreme Court eventually retreated from this position
with the onset of its interpretations of affirmative action. 39 Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court's decision to retreat would linger for
decades to come.40
II. THE BAKKE DECISION: THE CORNERSTONE OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION LITIGATION
Although the University of California v. Bakke decision is uni-
versally considered the cornerstone of the affirmative action debate
in the education arena, the first court to address this issue was
Defunis v. Odegaard, decided in 1974.41 In Defunis, Justice William
0. Douglas focused on the affirmative action issue in his dissent. 42
Although the Court dismissed certiorari to this equal protection
suit against the University of Washington School of Law, Justice
Douglas decided to address the issue in dissent. 43 In his dissent,
Justice Douglas condemned racial preference as a basis for selecting
37 McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (Petitioners,
two white employees were fired for just cause, while a black employee who com-
mitted the same violation was not. The district court dismissed the suit that alleged
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.).
38 Id. (holding that the district court erred in ruling that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1.964 did not apply to whites).
39 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 672
(1991) ("[I]t appeared that the government's interest in creating racial and ethnic
diversity in the faculties of all state operated schools, and in the faculty and student
bodies of state operated universities and professional schools, might allow the gov-
ernment to take cognizance of a person's race, so long as the government did not
establish a "racial quota" and did not stigmatize any member of any racial
group.").
40 See e.g., Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); University of Califor-
nia Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932; Wessman, 160
F.3d 790.
41 See, e.g., Defunis, 416 U.S. 312.
42 Id. (Plaintiff Defunis challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment the
admissions process at the University of Washington Law School. He had been
denied admission as a white applicant.).
43 Id. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Since Defunis would be graduating
before the rendering of a decision, the Court dismissed the action as moot.).
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students. 44 He explained that "the clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all sources of invidious
racial discrimination in the States. ' 45 Clearly, the admissions pro-
cess in this case was a digression from the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 Admission based on racial pref-
erence is no better than admission denied on racial preference. 47 In
the wake of Justice Douglas' warnings against constitutionally justi-
fying racial preferences, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1978 was finally
required to decide on the merits, for the first time, the debate over
affirmative action.
In University of California Regents v. Bakke, Justice Powell's
opinion would prove to be a landmark decision in the affirmative
action dispute.48 The Plaintiff, Allen Bakke, challenged the admis-
sions process at the University of California at Davis Medical
School based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI.49 The admissions program specifically
reserved sixteen seats for minority groups in each incoming class.
50
As such, Bakke, who was a white applicant that ranked higher than
minorities admitted via the quota, failed to gain admission into the
medical school.
51
In his opinion, Justice Powell reinforced the absolutist view of
the Equal Protection Clause that Justice Douglas had made clear
only four years earlier.52 Justice Powell held that it was constitu-
tionally permissible for the state to have a compelling interest in
achieving a diverse student body because of the various educational
benefits that result from this.53 Educational diversity was a principle
44 Id. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Applicants should not be judged solely
on race, but by their qualifications).
45 Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967)).
46 U. S. CONsT. art. XIV.
47 See Defunis, 416 U.S. at 337 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (All applicants de-
serve to be considered in a "race-neutral manner" under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.).
48 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
49 Id. at 275.
50 Id. at 279.
s Id. at 277.
52 See Defunis, 416 U.S. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
53 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-312 ("[T]he attainment of a diverse student
body ... clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education.").
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deeply entrenched in the First Amendment. 54 An "atmosphere of
speculation, experiment and creation" can be promoted by a di-
verse student body which creates the potential for the "robust ex-
change of ideas."' 55 Justice Powell also argued that racial quota
programs and preferential admissions processes are detrimental to
achieving what should be the school's ultimate objective of "genu-
ine diversity. ' 56 According to Justice Powell, the rationale behind
achieving "genuine diversity" is to mirror the diversity of society as
a whole. 57
.
Justice Powell warned that preferences based solely on race
posed a serious threat to the implementation of justice.5 8 First, the
danger of implementing such a program is that the courts may be
asked to impose individual burdens for the benefit of a particular
group.59 Second, implementation of such a program "may only re-
inforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable
to achieve success without special protection. ' 60 Third, allowing in-
nocent people to "bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of
their making" is inherently unfair. 61 To protect against these dan-
gers, Justice Powell developed a two-part opinion that weighed the
constitutionality of preferential race programs.
62
In Part I of his opinion, Justice Powell held that racial quotas
and preferential admission processes based solely on race were un-
constitutional if not justified by a compelling governmental inter-
54 U.S. CONST. art. I.
55 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S.'589, 603 (1967).
56 Id. at 313 ("An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular back-
ground-whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvan-
taged-may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and
ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to
render with understanding their vital service to humanity.").
57 Id. ("The law school, proving grounds for legal learning and practice, can-
not be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the
law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to
study law in a vacuum.").
58 Id. at 298.
59 Id. ("Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion that individuals
may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in order to enhance the
societal standing of their ethnic groups.").
60 Id.
61 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
62 Id. at 311-312, 320 (Justice Powell weighed the constitutionality of prefer-
ential programs against his diversity justification that allowed for the consideration
of race as a "plus" factor.).
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est.63 The legal detriment of racial quota programs or preferential
admissions processes is that it disregards "individual rights ... guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. '64 Justice Powell addressed
the quota system at issue in Bakke as "undeniably a classification
based on race and ethnic background." 65 Since minorities were
guaranteed at least 16 seats, it unlawfully allowed minority appli-
cants to compete for all 100 seats in the incoming class, while white
applicants could only compete for 84 seats.66 As such, Justice Pow-
ell held that the burden placed on the white applicants by the racial
quota program was contrary to the principle of absolute equality of
all individuals protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
67
Justice Powell warned that examination of racial classifications
required the strictest of judicial scrutiny on the "basis [that it] is
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
68
This strict scrutiny is necessary because such classifications are "in-
herently suspect" since they require innocent individuals to bear
certain burdens merely because of race. 69 As such, it must be
proven that racial classifications are necessary to promote a sub-
stantial state interest, such as remedying the effects of past discrimi-
nation. 70 In Bakke, because there were no such findings of past
instances of discrimination, the admissions program was held
unconstitutional.
71
In Part II of his opinion, Justice Powell held that the achieve-
ment of a diverse student body "is a constitutionally permissible
goal for an institution of higher education. '72 While unjustified ra-
63 Id. at 320.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 298.
66 Id.
67 See Bakke, U.S. 438 at 320 (Justice Powell affirmed the portion of the
decision by the Supreme Court of California that held the special admissions pro-
gram unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.).
68 Id. at 299.
69 Id. at 298.
70 Id. at 307 ("After [judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of consti-
tutional or statutory violations] have been made, the governmental interest in pre-
ferring members of the injured groups at the expense of others is substantial, since
the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated."); see also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
71 Id. at 309.
72 Id. at 311-312.
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cial quota programs and preferential admissions systems are unlaw-
ful, as deemed by Justice Powell, "genuine diversity" may be
achieved through the consideration of race as a "plus" factor in the
furtherance of this goal.7 3 Under this diversity justification, a mi-
nority applicant may be considered for admission based on "their
potential contribution to diversity"- that is, by looking at certain
characteristics such as "exceptional personal talents, unique work
or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated
compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to com-
municate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed impor-
tant. ' 74 Justice Powell points out that by focusing on these
particular characteristics, race is no longer a deciding factor but a
"plus" factor. 75 In this type of admissions process, qualifications
are weighed without preference to race and allow for equal treat-
ment under both the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.76
Post-Bakke courts have struggled to balance Justice Powell's
two-part opinion in Bakke, which required a strict presumption
against racial classifications, while justifying flexible racial prefer-
ences.77 These courts have argued that under Justice Powell's rea-
soning, the race factor was not completely eliminated from the
admissions process.78 For example, some minority applicants could
still gain admission over an equally qualified white applicant be-
cause of this demonstrated "plus" factor. 79 Furthermore, another
problem that plagued subsequent courts is that Justice Powell was
not endorsed by the majority of the Supreme Court. This, there-
fore, allowed the post-Bakke courts to pick and choose from Justice
Powell's reasoning, which ultimately resulted in very different
decisions.80
73 See Bakke, U.S. 438 at 317 (discussion of how the "plus" factor allows all
applicants to receive equal treatment, yet enables consideration to be given for
race or ethnic backgrounds); see infra note 56 and accompanying text.
74 2 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §27.10 at 69
(1997) ("Justice Powell's opinion is generally cited as the basis for university poli-




77 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
78 See discussion infra Part III.
79 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
80 See discussion infra Part 111.
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III. BAKKE'S APPLICATION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
CHALLENGES AT STATE UNIVERSITIES
Since 1996, the affirmative action issue addressed by Justice
Powell in Bakke has become a hot topic among the District and
Circuit Courts. 81 In 1996, the Fifth Circuit rendered a decision
based on a challenge to the University of Texas Law School's ad-
missions program in Hopwood v. Texas.82 In 1998, the First Circuit
decided Wessman v. Gittens, a challenge to Boston Latin School's
admissions policy.83 Although Wessman did not pertain to a uni-
versity admissions policy, it is highly relevant in discussing affirma-
tive action admission programs in the educational arena.
84
Recently, three additional suits have been commenced against the
University of Washington Law School, the University of Michigan
and the University of Michigan Law School, with each suit attack-
ing racial preference. 85 An examination of these reverse discrimi-
nation suits will demonstrate the path the District and Circuit
Courts have taken in light of the decision in Bakke.86 It is these
cases that influenced the Rutgers Law School-Newark to imple-
ment its new admissions program.87
In Hopwood v. Texas, four white applicants brought a reverse
discrimination suit against the University of Texas Law School,
challenging their denial of admission under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.88 The four applicants alleged that minority stu-
dents with lower GPA's and LSAT scores were granted admission
because of the heavy weight given to the factor of race under the
admissions procedure. 89 Under the admissions procedure, minori-
ties and non-minorities were reviewed by different committees, ap-
plications were placed in separate stacks based on race, and there
81 See discussion infra Part III.
82 Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932.
83 Wessman, 160 F.3d 790, 792.
84 See discussion infra Part 1II.
85 See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 2 F.Supp. 2d 1324 (W.D. Wash.
1998), cert. denied, 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2001); Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d 811; Grut-
ter, 137 F.Supp. 2d 821.
86 See discussion infra Part III.
87 See Gottlieb, supra note 2 ("[T]he new admissions system [is] calculated
to immunize its aggressive recruitment of minorities from reverse discrimination
suits").
88 See Hopwood, 438 F.3d at 938.
89 Id. at 937 n.8.
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were different requirement standards for minorities and non-
minorities. 90
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit seemed to contradict Part II of
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.91 It held that race, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, cannot be used as a factor in an admis-
sions process designed to facilitate the diversification of the student
body.92 In effect, the court eliminated all affirmative action plans in
public universities within its jurisdiction.
93
The court in Hopwood held that all race-based admissions pro-
cedures for the purpose of achieving diversity are unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.94 The Law School defended its admissions program by claim-
ing that it served the purpose of promoting diversity and remedying
past wrongs. 95 This fruitless claim was an attempt to meet the justi-
fication requirement under Justice Powell's strict scrutiny analysis.
96
The Fifth Circuit, however, narrowed Justice Powell's strict scrutiny
analysis, and banned all racial quotas or preferential programs un-
less designed to remedy past discrimination. 97 The Fifth Circuit, in
effect, eliminated the diversity justification, and thus, any discussion
of the "plus" factor in the Bakke decision.98
The Supreme Court in Bakke held that the creation of a diver-
sified school environment was a compelling state interest that could
90 Id. at 937 (applications were color-coded according to race and separate
waiting lists were maintained according to race).
91 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962 ("[W]e hold that the University of Texas
School of Law may not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in
order to achieve a diverse student body.").
92 Id. at 962.
93 Fifth Circuit jurisdiction includes Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
94 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 ("[A]ny consideration of race or ethnicity by
the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compel-
ling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
95 Id. at 948 ("The law school, in response, notes Texas's well documented
history of discrimination in education and argues that its effects continue today at
the law school, both in the level of educational attainment of the average minority
applicant and in the school's reputation.").
96 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299 (Racial classifications require the strictest of
judicial scrutiny on the "basis [that it] is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.").
97 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 ("[A] majority of the Supreme Court held
that a state actor may racially classify where it has a 'strong basis in the evidence
for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.'") (quoting City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469, 500).
98 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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justify affirmative action admissions programs. 99 This justification,
however, has been repeatedly denounced by subsequent courts.100
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court dis-
cussed that the only state interest justification for racial classifica-
tions is to remedy past wrongs. 10 1 The Fifth Circuit reiterated this
reasoning in Hopwood by declaring that "any consideration of race
or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse
student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment."'01 2 The Fifth Circuit held that using race as a crite-
rion for accomplishing diversity is a frustration of the true purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
10 3
The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that a valid justification for
an affirmative action admissions program is to remedy the present
effects of past discrimination.1 04 In Hopwood, this meant that the
state had to prove "through its legislature ... that past segregation
has present effects. 1 05 In proving past wrongs, the state is limited
to the past discriminatory practices of only the state actor (in Hop-
wood, this is the Law School).10 6 As such, the Fifth Circuit rejected
the state's loose claim that the admissions program was designed to
remedy the effects of discrimination in primary and secondary
schools. 0
7
The Fifth Circuit then rejected the Law School's claim that it
had a poor reputation among minority communities as a hostile en-
vironment for minorities because of its discriminatory practices
prior to the 1960's.108 The Law School argued that the admissions
99 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-312 ("[Tihe attainment of a diverse student
body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
learning.").
100 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 ("No case since Bakke has accepted diver-
sity as a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny analysis.").
101 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of
stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in
fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.")
(While this case concerned discrimination in the workplace, it is important to note
that Justice Powell's diversity justification never garnered much support.).
102 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 947-948.
103 Id.
104 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
105 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 951.
106 Id. at 954 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
499,"[T]he Croson Court unequivocally restricted the proper scope of the remedial
interest to the state actor that had previously discriminated.").
107 Id.
108 See Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 572.
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program was designed to remedy this situation. 10 9 In response, the
Fifth Circuit noted that this past overt discrimination by the Law
School was cured by the Court's decision in Sweatt v. Painter in
1950.110 In addition, any further discrimination that may have
taken place was remedied by the Supreme Court's decision in
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County in 1968.111 The
Fifth Circuit continued by stating that any present "racial tension at
the law school is... the result of present societal discrimination and,
if anything, is contributed to, rather than alleviated by, the overt
and prevalent consideration of race in admissions."' 1 2 Further-
more, a perception of a hostile environment is not a justification for
an affirmative admissions program. 113
Ultimately, in Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit decided that the
University of Texas Law School's affirmative action admissions pro-
gram had failed to meet the requirements as a remedial program.," 4
Furthermore, the Law School could not justify its affirmative action
admissions program because of perceptions as a hostile environ-
ment." 5 The justification of creating diversity, as announced in
Bakke, was held to be invalid. 16 The Law School's admissions pro-
gram was deemed unconstitutional as well. 117 As a result, the four




110 Sweatt v Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (The Court struck down the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School's admission program, which denied admission to all
blacks.).
M 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (The Supreme Court deemed the "freedom of choice"
plan as unacceptable in the efforts to desegregate New Kent County, VA. The
"freedom of choice" plan allowed students to choose the public school that they
wanted to attend. As a result, most white students chose their former school and
most black students chose their former school. Since there existed better alterna-
tives in the effort to desegregate, such as zoning, the Court held the "freedom of
choice" plan as unacceptable.).
112 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 955 ("The goals established by the law school are precisely the re-
verse of that intuitive expectation and are more reflective of a goal of diversity
(which we hold is not compelling) than a goal of remedying past discrimination.").
115 Id. at 953.
116 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
117 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d 200, 962.
118 Id.
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In 1998, the First Circuit decided the issue of affirmative action
in Wessman v. Gittens.119 Although the affirmative action dispute
occurred at three examination schools operated by the Boston
School Committee, the holding and reasoning of the First Circuit is
relevant to its position on affirmative action in the educational con-
text within its jurisdiction. 120 The admissions policy at these exami-
nation schools required 35% of the seats in the entering class to be
set-aside for minorities.1 21 In 1997, Sarah Wessman and ten other
white applicants were denied admission in favor of minority stu-
dents with lower composite scores and rankings.122
The First Circuit applied the strict scrutiny standard of Justice
Powell's decision in Bakke.1 23 The First Circuit specifically referred
to Bakke and noted that "any program which induces schools to
grant preferences based on race and ethnicity is constitutionally
suspect."'1 24 Although the Fifth Circuit rejected diversity as a com-
pelling interest in the educational arena, the Supreme Court has yet
to rule on this specific issue.125 The First Circuit, referencing
Bakke, examined the School Committee's admissions policy under
both the diversity justification and the remedial justification. 12
6
Under the diversity justification, Justice Powell noted that race
may be one of the factors in evaluating a candidate, but it cannot be
the sole factor.127 In Wessman, the First Circuit noted that the
School Committee's affirmative action policy allowed only minority
applicants to compete for a certain percentage of seats, thus deny-
ing white applicants from competing for these seats. 28 Such a pol-
icy cannot be considered constitutional under the diversity
justification, but rather, it resembles a racial-balancing program. 29
119 Wessman, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
120 Id. at 791 (The City of Boston managed three examination schools, one of
which was the Boston Latin School.).
121 Id. at 793.
122 Id. at 793-794.
123 See infra note 96 and accompanying text; see also Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. at 224.
124 See Wessman, 160 F.3d at 794.
125 Id. at 795-796.
126 Id. at 796.
127 Id. at 798 (quoting Justice Powell in Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978)) ("The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which ra-
cial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.").
128 See Wessman, 160 F.3 at 800.
129 Id. at 798.
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As such, the classification system implemented by the School Com-
mittee cannot be justified under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1
30
In Wessman, the First Circuit also examined the admissions
policy under the remedial justification. 31 Under the remedial justi-
fication, the governmental actor must prove through strong evi-
dence that the current policy is designed to cure current
discrimination problems caused by past discrimination. 132 This jus-
tification is interpreted very narrowly.1 33 The only evidence that
the School Committee introduced was a provision entitled "Perma-
nent Injunction," a decree entered in 1994 in Morgan v. Nucci.134
This provision stated that the Boston public school system is pre-
vented from engaging in any race-based segregation.135 The provi-
sion did not mention a requirement to put into effect affirmative
action programs. 136 In fact, the First Circuit noted that the provi-
sion appeared to denounce any affirmative action programs. 137 Be-
yond this, the School Committee only offered statistical and
anecdotal evidence to support its demonstration of past discrimina-
tory practices.1 38 As such, the First Circuit determined that the
School Committee had failed to establish a strong evidentiary basis
of past discrimination required to effectuate the remedial
justification. 39
The First Circuit held that the School Committee had failed to
establish any justification for its affirmative action policy under
both the diversity justification and the remedial justification of
130 Id. at 800 (The First Circuit concluded that the School Committee's policy
did not meet the Bakke standard.).
131 Id.
132 Id. (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500. The
government actor must have "a strong basis in evidence" that there exists effects of
past discrimination which the admissions policy is designed to correct).
133 Id.
134 Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 1987).
135 Id.
136 Id.
i37 See Wessman, 160 F.3d at 801 (quoting Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214,
215 (D. Mass. 1985).The Permanent Injunction 'enjoins the School Committee
"from discriminating on the basis of race in the operation of the public schools in
any school or other facility in the Boston public school system."').
138 Id. at 802.
139 Id. at 807 (The First Circuit found no discrimination present, so there was
no need for remedial admissions policy.).
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Bakke.140 As such, the Boston Latin School's admissions procedure
was held unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 141 As a result, Sarah Wessman was
granted admission into Boston Latin School.142
In 1997, three white plaintiffs filed a reverse discrimination
lawsuit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the
University of Washington Law School.1 43 While the admissions pol-
icy stated that the admissions committee focuses primarily on grade
point average and LSAT scores, the committee will also consider
factors such as difficulty of undergraduate program, attainment of
advanced degrees, recommendations, and social or economic disad-
vantage. 144 The admission policy did specifically state, however,
that "no single factor will confer admission on an academically un-
qualified applicant. '' 145 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of
the District Court that this claim is moot because the state had
passed Initiative Measure 200, which prohibits the grant of prefer-
ential treatment, based on race, in federally-funded programs.
1 46
In similar suits, two white plaintiffs challenged the admissions
policy at both the University of Michigan and its Law School which
used race as factor in considering applicants .147 Their reverse dis-
crimination suits were also brought under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.148 The District
Court granted summary judgement in Gratz v. Bollinger, declaring
that the admissions program was unconstitutional between 1995
140 Id. at 809 (The First Circuit held that the Boston Latin School's admis-
sions policy was unconstitutional.).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See Smith, 2 F.Supp. 2d 1324, 1335 ("Plaintiffs have asserted a claim
against the University of Washington Law School under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d").
144 Id. at 1328 (motions for partial summary judgement and class
certification).
145 Id. at 1329.
146 See Smith, 233 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Native Village of
Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505,1510 (9th Cir. 1994). "As we declared in
Noatak, 38 F.3d at 1510, 'a statutory change ... is usually enough to render a case
moot, even if the legislature possesses the power to reenact the statute after the
lawsuit is dismissed. As a general rule, if a challenged law is repealed or expires,
the case becomes moot."').
147 Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d 811; Grutter, 137 F.Supp. 2d 821.
148 Id.
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and 1998.149 However, the court ruled in favor of The University of
Michigan by holding that the admissions program was constitu-
tional between 1999 to 2000 under the Bakke rationale. 150 The Dis-
trict Court judge in Grutter v. Bollinger contradicted the Gratz
decision and deemed the admission system at University of Michi-
gan Law School unconstitutional under the Hopwood rationale. 151
Many people involved with these cases believe that the contradic-
tory opinions yielded by the District Court may "send the issue
back to the United States Supreme Court for the first time since
1978."152
IV. RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK: OUT WITH THE OLD AND
IN WITH THE NEW
With the onslaught of recent reverse discrimination cases at
universities around the country, Rutgers Law School-Newark has
created a new admissions program whereby the race factor is no
longer considered as an isolated factor.1 53 Under its new admis-
sions program, Rutgers Law School-Newark is able to actively re-
cruit minorities based on non-race factors, such as overcoming
economic and educational disadvantages. 154 The ability to effec-
149 See Gratz, 122 F.Supp. 2d at 836 (From 1995-1998, the University of Mich-
igan used a quota system very similar to the one used by the University of Califor-
nia-Davis in Bakke.).
150 Id. at 836 (From 1999 until the present, the university has considered race,
but only as a "plus" factor as discussed in Bakke.).
151 Grutter, 137 F.Supp. 2d at 872 ("[T]he University of Michigan Law
School's use of race as a factor in its admissions decisions is unconstitutional and a
violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The law school's justification for
using race-to assemble a racially diverse population-is not a compelling state
interest.").
152 Jodi Wilgoren, U.S. Court Bars Race as a Factor in School Entry, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 28, 2001, at A18.
153 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK CATALOG
27 (2000-2002) ("Every applicant may choose to compete for admission with pri-
mary emphasis placed either on numerical indicators, such as LSAT and UGPA, or
on non-numerical indicators, such as experiences and accomplishments, personal
and academic achievements, community service, extraordinary family circum-
stances, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic background. Under non-numerical
evaluation, less, though still significant, emphasis is placed on LSAT scores and
UGPA.").
154 Id. at 27 (While these two options are available to all applicants, a minor-
ity or disadvantaged applicant can also choose to be considered under the Minority
Student Program or MSP. "Admission to the school with inclusion in MSP is
based primarily on educational and employment experiences, personal and aca-
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tively recruit minorities without considering race allows Rutgers
Law School-Newark to continue to provide a diverse educational
environment without the possibility of encountering reverse dis-
crimination lawsuits under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.155
Prior to 2000, the criteria for consideration of students was
very different. 15 6 Under the old admissions system, the chief crite-
ria in assessing applicants were the student's test scores and college
grades. 157 An applicant, however, could also choose to be consid-
ered for the Minority Student Program.15 8 While a few low-income
white applicants were accepted, the majority of those admitted
were minorities. 15 9 More specifically, the program was designed to
cater to students who "had a history of poverty... or ... were edu-
cationally, culturally, or socio-economically disadvantaged."
60
This program had been in effect from 1968 until 2000.161
Since 1997, Rutgers Law School-Newark has been the subject
of a reverse bias complaint still being investigated. 162 Filed with the
Office for Civil Rights for the United States Department of Educa-
tion, a white applicant, William Maher, complained that he had a
demic accomplishments, community service, socioeconomic background, and ex-
traordinary family circumstances, with less though still significant, emphasis on the
LSAT and UGPA.").
155 See supra Part III; see infra Part IV.
156 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK CATALOG
25 (1998-2000).
157 Id. ("Admission to the school is based primarily on the Law School Ad-
missions Test (LSAT) and score of the applicant's undergraduate grade-point aver-
age (UGPA).").
158 Id. ("The Minority Student Program (MSP) is a special admissions pro-
gram for minorities and disadvantaged applicants.").
159 See Evelyn Agpar, Rutgers Law-Newark: An Affirmative Action Effort
Faces Scrutiny, N.J. Law. 3 (June 7, 1999) (While the program was aimed at assist-
ing disadvantaged applicants of all races, only a few low-income white applicants
were admitted. The majority of those admitted under the MSP were minorities.).
160 See Gottlieb, supra note 2, at 1106.
161 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAw-NEWARK CATALOG
28 (2000-2002) (implemented to address concern in Newark following the Newark
Riots of 1967).
162 See Evelyn Apgar, Rutgers Law-Newark; An Affirmative Action Effort
Faces Scrutiny, N.J. LAW. 1 (Apr. 12, 1999) (The United States Department of
Education is involved in a continued investigation of this complaint. As such, ac-
cess to material involved in this investigation is very limited until the investigation
is concluded.).
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disadvantaged background, but was rejected for the Minority Stu-
dent Program.163
The Office of Civil Rights investigated the law school's admis-
sions procedures between 1995 and 1997.164 All applicants during
these years were required to submit grades from any undergraduate
or graduate programs, LSAT scores, letters of recommendation,
employment and public service activities, and an essay regarding
their personal qualities.165 Additionally, applicants were permitted
to participate in the Minority Students Program on the application
by checking a box according to race and discussing their personal
circumstances associated with their ethnic or economic back-
ground.1 66 In these two years, approximately 1,000 applicants ap-
plied for the Minority Student Program out of 2,500 total
applicants. 167 Nearly one out of every three students in the fresh-
man classes between 1995-1997 were minorities who gained admis-
sion via the Minority Student Program. 168 Furthermore, reports
from past years indicated that it was possible for a minority appli-
cant to be granted admission under the Minority Student Program
with a LSAT score that was 10 points lower than other
applicants.169
The Office of Civil Rights discovered that Maher had scored
"substantially lower" than all other applicants on his LSAT and that
his GPA was higher than only two other white applicants.170 Based
on the Office of Civil Rights findings, they found the information
insufficient to sustain William Maher's racial discrimination claim
under either the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.171
163 Id. (Maher . . filed the complaint, "contending the school discriminated
against him because of his race and gave preference to less qualified minorities
entering through MSP.").
164 See Apgar, supra note 159.
165 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK APPLICA-
TION FOR ADMISON (1997).
166 Id.
167 See Apgar, supra note 159.
168 See Apgar, supra note 159.
169 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAw-NEWARK CATALOG
25 (1998-2000) ("For the class entering in 1997 under the regular admissions pro-
gram, the median LSAT score was in the eighty-first percentile and the median
GPA was 3.30. Students admitted in 1997 under the Minority Student Program had
a median UGPA of 3.26 and a median LSAT score in the forty-eighth percentile.").
170 See Apgar, supra note 159.
171 See Apgar, supra note 159.
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Despite surviving this reverse bias attack, the Rutgers Law
School-Newark realized the necessity to address its admissions pro-
gram.172 Coupled by the decisions in Hopwood and Wessman,
Rutgers Law School-Newark realized the need to create an admis-
sions program that did not overtly consider race, but that could still
create an ethnically diverse learning environment. 173 Responsible
for the ingenious new admissions program were Dean Stuart
Deutsch and Admissions Director Anita Walton.
174
The new admissions program provides all applicants with two
options.175 The first option permits the applicant to choose to be
considered mainly on test scores and grades. 176 The second option
permits the applicant to be considered "based primarily on educa-
tion and employment experiences, personal and academic accom-
plishments, community service, socio-economic background,
extraordinary family circumstances and the contribution the appli-
cant will make to the overall diversity in the school.' 77 In addition,
test scores and grades are considered in the second option.178 The
Minority Student Program is a third option, "available to minority
applicants and, regardless of race or ethnic origin, to disadvantaged
172 SUSAN WELCH & JOHN GRUHL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY
ENROLLMENTS IN MEDICAL AND LAW SCHOOLS 144-145 (1998) ("Although Bakke
legitimized affirmative action in higher education for some years, in the 1990s sup-
port among governmental officials for affirmative action eroded significantly. By
that time, most universities, along with other institutions, were examining their
affirmative action practices.").
173 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAw-NEWARK CATALOG
28 (2000-2002) (Since 1968, the policy behind the MSP has been "to pursue aggres-
sively a policy of diversity and equal opportunity to ensure a diverse educational
environment and to expand access to legal education to those who historically
have been underrepresented in the legal profession."). See also Gottlieb, supra
note 2 ("[T]he new admissions program is calculated to immunize its aggressive
recruitment of minorities from reverse discrimination suits.").
174 See Gottlieb, supra note 2.
175 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK CATALOG
27 (2000-2002).
176 Id. ("Every applicant may choose to compete for admission with primary
emphasis placed on numerical indicators, such as LSAT scores and UGPA.").
177 Id. ("Every applicant may choose to compete for admission with primary
emphasis placed ... on non-numerical indicators, such as experiences and accom-
plishments, personal and academic achievements, community service, extraordi-
nary family circumstances, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic background. Under
non-numerical evaluation, less, though still significant, emphasis is placed on
LSAT scores and UGPA.").
178 Id. ("Under the non-numerical evaluation, less, though still significant,
emphasis is placed on LSAT scores and UGPA.").
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applicants.' 79 Applicants choosing this option are evaluated based
"primarily on educational and employment experiences, personal
and academic accomplishments, community service, socioeconomic
background, and extraordinary family circumstances, with less
though still significant, emphasis on the LSAT and UGPA."180
Under the new admissions program, three administrators and
two faculty members review all applications. 81 Under the oldsys-
tem, only one or two people considered applicants for the Minority
Student Program. 182 Reviews about the new admissions system
have been highly optimistic for the most part. 83 Rutgers Law
School-Newark can now continue to effectively recruit minorities,
but not because they are minorities. 84 The option of "overcoming
economic and educational disadvantages" now allows the Law
School to target applicants with certain backgrounds that are usu-
ally associated with minorities. 85 Rutgers Law School-Newark has
designed its new admission program to fit the compromise that Jus-
tice Powell envisioned in his reasoning in Bakke. 8
6
V. RESOLVING BAKKE'S AMBIGUITY
In Defunis, Justice Douglas envisioned a race-neutral affirma-
tive action plan 26 years before Rutgers Law School-Newark would
implement their own.' 87 In his dissent, he stated that "there is no
bar.. .to considering an individual's prior achievements in light of
racial discrimination that barred his way, as a factor in attempting
179 RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, SCHOOL OF LAw-NEWARK CATALOG
28 (2000-2002) (section discussing Minority Student Program).
180 Id. (discussing method of evaluation for MSP applicants).
181 See Gottlieb, supra note 2, at 1106.
182 See Gottlieb, supra note 2, at 1106 (comparing the rigorous, new selection
process with the old selection process).
183 See Gottlieb, supra note 2 (Curt Levy, assistant director of the Center for
Individual Rights states, "You couldn't challenge them facially even though the
new system is obviously intended to favor racial minorities." Kent Lollis of the
Law School Admissions Council also states "that the Rutgers Minority Student
program has billed itself as a race-neutral program in recent years, but now they're
trying to formalize it.").
184 See Gottlieb, supra note 2 (discussing the advantage of the new system).
185 See Gottlieb, supra note 2.
186 See Bakke, 438 U.S at 317 (discussion of how the "plus" factor allows all
applicants to receive equal treatment, yet enables consideration to be given for
race or ethnic backgrounds).
187 See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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to assess his true potential for a successful legal career."' 188 Justice
Douglas's statement is the exact definition of a true affirmative ac-
tion plan as guaranteed by the equality clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 89 Rutgers Law School-Newark's new admissions
program takes great strides towards fulfilling Justice Douglas's vi-
sion of nearly thirty years ago. 190
When applying the new admissions program at Rutgers Law
School-Newark to the Bakke decision, the embodiment of Justice
Powell's affirmative action plan comes to life. 191 The new admis-
sions program retains the absolutist view of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that Justice Powell so carefully reinforced. 192 Rutgers Law
School-Newark has effectively preserved the guarantee of equality
by eliminating its overtly race-based criteria. 193 Race is no longer
an isolated factor in considering applicants; instead, the new admis-
sions system now focuses on individual accomplishments and
achievements by examining obstacles that applicants overcome. 194
This criteria now provides the same diverse learning environment,
but not at the expense of other individuals. 195 Rutgers Law School-
Newark has restored the societal balance at its school by creating
"genuine diversity. '1 96
As Rutgers Law School-Newark administrators suggested, its
new admissions program fits well within the mold of Justice Pow-
ell's reasoning in Bakke. 197 Justice Powell required strict judicial
scrutiny in examining any admissions process designed to foster the
188 See Defunis, 416 U.S. at 340-341.
189 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (The equality guarantee
of the Equal Protection Clause states "[t]he law which operates upon one man
shall operate equally upon all.").
190 See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
191 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (discussion of how the "plus" factor allows all
applicants to receive equal treatment, yet enables consideration to be given for
race or ethnic backgrounds).
192 See Defunis, 416 U.S. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
193 See supra text accompanying note 189.
194 See Gottlieb, supra note 2.
195 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (Allowing innocent people to "bear the bur-
dens of redressing grievances not of their making" is inherently unfair.).
196 See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
197 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (discussion of how the "plus" factor allows all
applicants to receive equal treatment, yet enables consideration to be given for
race or ethnic backgrounds); Id. at 320 (Under Justice Powell's reasoning, which
weighed the constitutionality of race-based admissions programs, racial quota pro-
grams and preferential race programs were held unconstitutional, unless they
could be justified by a compelling state interest.).
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needs of the disadvantaged. 198 Justice Powell also condemned any
system that provided overt race classifications, such as racial quotas
and preferential admissions programs, unless it could be justified
under a compelling state interest. 199 The new admissions program
is distinguishable from a racial quota or a preferential program,
since both hinge primarily on race.200 In fact, the program factors
the determination of certain individuals who have overcome educa-
tional and economic barriers into an equation revolving around
grades and LSAT scores.201 The program, in essence, places all ap-
plicants, regardless of race, who have excelled in disadvantageous
environments on equal footing with all applicants, regardless of
race, who have excelled in an advantageous environment.
20 2 This
type of systematic balancing does nothing more than preserve the
equality of all individuals, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, without overt considerations of race. 20 3
In Bakke, Justice Powell promoted the consideration of race as
a "plus" factor in the achievement of "genuine diversity. '204 The
creators of the new admissions program have surpassed what Jus-
tice Powell envisioned when he made a "plus" factor permissible.
20 5
By effectively cloaking any considerations of race under the guise
of a "life experiences" option, Rutgers Law School-Newark has
given merit to the individual applicant based on his/her accomplish-
ments in an adverse environment. 20 6 Although, as the stereotype
goes, certain minorities are affected more by these adverse condi-
tions in terms of economics and education, the new admissions sys-
198 Id. at 299 (Justice Powell warned that examination of racial classifications
required the strictest of judicial scrutiny on the "basis [that it] is precisely tailored
to serve a compelling governmental interest.").
199 Id. at 320 (Under Justice Powell's reasoning, which weighed the constitu-
tionality of race-based admissions programs, racial quota programs and preferen-
tial race programs were held unconstitutional, unless they could be justified by a
compelling state interest.).
200 Id. at 289 (Justice Powell classified quota system and preferential admis-
sions processes as "undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic back-
ground.").
201 See Gottlieb, supra note 2, at 1106.
202 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (The equality guarantee
of the Equal Protection Clause states "[t]he law which operates upon one man
shall operate equally upon all.").
203 Id.
204 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
205 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
206 See Gottlieb supra note 2, at 1106.
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tern, nonetheless, targets these same people, but for a different
reason.20 7 So, instead of Justice Powell's suggestion that race be
considered a "plus" factor in determining admission, the new ad-
missions program uses accomplishments in the face of educational
and economic adversity as its "plus" factor.
20 8
Justice Powell, unsure as to how to resolve the problem of af-
firmative action, was perhaps reluctant to completely eliminate the
consideration of race for fear of completely excluding minorities.
20 9
This distinguishing feature of the new admissions program embod-
ies the minority consideration that Justice Powell envisioned when
he announced the "plus" factor in his decision.210 As such, the new
admissions program survives the strict scrutiny that Justice Powell
sought, yet it further solidifies his reasoning by implementing his
"plus" factor.21 1
This distinguishing feature is the key factor to the entire prob-
lem that subsequent courts have struggled with over the years in
affirmative action cases. 212 The Fifth Circuit ultimately strayed
from Bakke through its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.213 In light of the new admissions program, it appears that
even the Fifth Circuit, which effectively barred affirmative action
except when used to remedy effects of past discrimination, would
support the new admissions program at Rutgers Law School-New-
ark.214 The new admissions program reconciles the decision of the
Fifth Circuit in Hopwood with Bakke.
21 5
The Fifth Circuit banned nearly all programs that consider race
as a factor, alluding to the dangers that such a program could im-
207 See Gottlieb supra note 2 (The option of "overcoming economic and edu-
cational disadvantages" now allows Rutgers Law School-Newark to target appli-
cants with certain backgrounds that are usually associated with minorities.).
208 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
209 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
210 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
211 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
212 See discussion infra Part III.
213 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (The equality guarantee
of the Equal Protection Clause states "[tihe law which operates upon one man
shall operate equally upon all.").
214 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 ("[A] majority of the Supreme Court held
that a state actor may racially classify where it has a 'strong basis in the evidence
for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.'") (quoting City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. 469, 500).
215 See discussion infra Part III.
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pose on society.2 16 The only exception that the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered a compelling state interest was for remedying past
discrimination. 21 7 The admissions program at Rutgers Law School-
Newark would survive the strict holding of the Fifth Circuit, as well
as be compatible with the Bakke opinion.21 8 The central issue that
the Fifth Circuit was concerned with was the dangers in using race
to weigh individuals in admissions processes, rather than weighing
the qualifications of the individual.21 9 The Rutgers Law School-
Newark admissions program does not consider race in its evalua-
tion, but considers "overcoming economic and educational disad-
vantages" and makes this method of evaluation available to all
races.220 Since Rutgers Law School-Newark does consider "over-
coming economic and educational disadvantages" as a qualification
in its admissions process, the program would be compatible with
the Hopwood decision.221 In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit noted that
"some factors such as economic or educational background of one's
parents may be somewhat correlated with race. This correlation,
however, will not render the use of the factor unconstitutional if it
is not adopted for the purpose of discriminating on the basis of
race. '"222 The Fifth Circuit is effectively denouncing race as a factor
for consideration, yet is suggesting that it is constitutional to weigh
educational or economic background. 223 This is exactly what
Rutgers Law School-Newark utilizes in its admissions program.
224
The First Circuit, which decided Wessman, allowed for the con-
sideration of race as one, but not the sole factor. 225 This is similar
to the Bakke decision, which allowed for the consideration of the
216 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 ("[T]he use of race in admissions for diver-
sity in higher education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal
protection.").
217 Id. at 948.
218 See discussion infra Part III (The admissions program at Rutgers Law
School-Newark does not use race as a consideration, as Hopwood emphasized, and
yet, implements a "plus" factor that considers overcoming educational and eco-
nomic disadvantages, which the Bakke emphasized.).
219 See infra note 216 and accompanying text.
220 See discussion supra Part IV.
221 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 ("[Tlhe use of race in admissions for diver-
sity in higher education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal
protection.").
222 Id. at 947 n.31.
223 Id.
224 See Gottlieb, supra note 2.
225 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
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"plus" factor.226 Again, the Rutgers Law School-Newark goes be-
yond the reasoning in Wessman, and uses "overcoming economic




The fact that race is not considered in its admissions program is
the key component to the equation that allows Rutgers Law
School-Newark to be compatible with both the Bakke/Wessman ra-
tionale and the Hopwood rationale. 228 While the Bakke/Wessman
rationale recognizes that certain races do experience particular dis-
advantages in society, it refuses to make race the primary consider-
ation in admissions.229 The Hopwood rationale recognizes the
societal dangers of race consideration in admissions processes, and
thus only justifies it when implemented to remedy the effects of
past discrimination. 230 In an attempt to prevent the distribution of
unfair burdens and the fostering of stereotypes, the Fifth Circuit
eliminated the consideration of race with one exception. 231 Rutgers
Law School-Newark's admission program reconciles these different
rationales.232 The program is the perfect example of what the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment seeks to
achieve: giving all people an equal opportunity and standing.
233
However, this goal can be accomplished only by considering the
226 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
227 See discussion supra Part IV.
228 See discussion infra Part III (The admissions program at Rutgers Law
School-Newark does not use race as a consideration, as Hopwood emphasized, and
yet, implements a "plus" factor that considers overcoming educational and eco-
nomic disadvantages, which the Bakke emphasized.).
229 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (discussion of how the "plus" factor allows all
applicants to receive equal treatment, yet enables consideration to be given for
race or ethnic backgrounds).
230 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948 ("[A] majority of the Supreme Court held
that a state actor may racially classify where it has a 'strong basis in the evidence
for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.'") (quoting City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Company, 488 U.S. at 500).
231 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 ("Nothing in the Constitution supports the
notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in
order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups.").
232 See discussion infra Part III.
233 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (The equality guarantee
of the Equal Protection Clause states "[t]he law which operates upon one man
shall operate equally upon all.").
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disadvantages that certain applicants have encountered along the
way.234 This removes the burden from the disadvantaged applicant
without placing it on the applicant who has neither suffered from
nor caused that same disadvantage. 235 The Circuit courts recog-
nized that all people are not on equal footing.236 Their struggle oc-
curred when they tried to resolve this problem by continuing to
foster the use of considerations of race. 237 Race inherently charac-
terizes a group of individuals, while considerations of disadvantages
overcome applies only to individuals.238 While it is true that certain
races tend to experience certain disadvantages more prevalently, it
is too risky to the promotion of justice to make such assumptions
and apply it to the entire race. 239 This is detrimental not only to
those who are assumed to be disadvantaged, but to those who un-
fairly bear the burdens of such an assumption through no fault of
their own.
240
234 See Gottlieb, supra note 2, at 1106.
235 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 ("Nothing in the Constitution supports the
notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in
order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups.").
236 See discussion infra Part III (The courts acknowledged that there were
indeed minority and majority applicants in each case. Their struggle was over the
admissions process itself.).
237 Id.; see also Race and Ethnicity in 2001: Attitudes, Perceptions and Exper-
iences, THE WASH. POST/KAISER FAMILY FOUND./HARVARD UNIV. PUBLIC OPIN-
ION POLL 22 (2001) (94% of whites, 86% of African Americans, 88% of Hispanics
and 84% of Asians felt that admission to college should be based strictly on merit
and qualifications other than race or ethnicity.).
238 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 (Justice Powell classified quota system and
preferential admissions processes as "undeniably a classification based on race and
ethnic background.").
239 See WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 172, at 172-173 ("A more sweeping
proposal to reform affirmative action is to eliminate existing programs based on
race and substitute new programs based on class. The underlying assumption is
that numerous minorities who are not disadvantaged are benefiting from affirma-
tive action."); see also Rep. Charles T. Canady, America's Struggle for Racial
Equality, Pol'y Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1998, No. 87 at 5 ("Preferences attack the dignity of
the preferred, and cast a pall of doubt over their competence and worth. Prefer-
ences send a message that those in the favored groups are deemed incapable of
meeting the standards that others are required to meet. Simply because they are
members of a preferred group, individuals are often deprived of the recognition
and respect they have earned.").
240 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 ("Nothing in the Constitution supports the
notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in
order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups."). See also D.W.
Miller, Opportunity Without Preference, POLICY REV., Nov.-Dec., 1998, No. 92
(concluding how affirmative action policies only increase enrollments of minori-
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While many in the academic world continue to condemn Hop-
wood as a suspect contradiction of Bakke, Hopwood was an essen-
tial step in the resolution of this process.241 The Rutgers Law
School-Newark admissions process is more of a product of the Hop-
wood rationale, rather than the BakkeWessman rationale. 242 The
Bakke/Wessman rationale sought to rectify the problems that disad-
vantaged people were encountering, yet it tried to resolve such
problems by using race. 243 The Fifth Circuit eliminated considera-
tions of race because it understood that if all people were to be
placed on equal footing under the true meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, considerations of race would have to be eliminated.244
The Fifth Circuit was unsure on exactly how this could be done ef-
fectively. The Fifth Circuit, however, provided some suggestions
that would later prove to be on point.245 The new admissions pro-
gram at Rutgers Law School-Newark is merely a solution to a prob-
lem that courts have struggled with for almost thirty years.
246
The admissions program at Rutgers Law School-Newark has
also remedied another problem. An increasing number of reverse
discrimination lawsuits have arisen in state universities. 247 To com-
bat this problem, states have taken steps to ban affirmative action
ties, but are counterproductive because they result in systematic mismatching of
unprepared students with rigorous programs of study).
241 See Gottlieb, supra note 2 (With the implementation of the new admis-
sions program at Rutgers Law School-Newark, the school is now "a less likely
candidate for an attack like the one that'ended affirmative 'action at the University
of Texas Law School.").
242 See Gottlieb, supra note 2.
243 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (discussion of how the "plus" factor allows all
applicants to receive equal treatment, yet enables consideration to be given for
race or ethnic backgrounds).
244 See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 ("[Tlhe use of race in admissions for diver-
sity in higher education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal
protection.").
245 Id. at 947 n.31 (In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit noted that "some factors
such as economic or educational background of one's parents may be somewhat
correlated with race. This correlation, however, will not render the use of the fac-
tor unconstitutional if it is not adopted for the purpose of discriminating on the
basis of race.").
246 See discussion infra Part III (The admissions program at Rutgers Law
School-Newark does not use race as a consideration, as Hopwood emphasized, and
yet, implements a "plus" factor that considers overcoming educational and eco-
nomic disadvantages, which the Bakke emphasized.).
247 See discussion infra Part III.
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programs in its institutions.248 Consequently, disadvantaged appli-
cants are, once again, placed on unequal footing.249 The Rutgers
Law School-Newark admissions program can cater to the needs of
the disadvantaged, even in states where affirmative action programs
have been banned.250 The University of California at Berkeley, for
example, has already implemented an admissions program very
similar to the program at Rutgers Law School-Newark.
251
In conclusion, admissions programs similar to the program im-
plemented at Rutgers Law School-Newark can do nothing but ben-
efit all those involved.2 52 The disadvantaged are placed on an equal
platform with applicants who have not experienced such disadvan-
tages. 253 The schools implementing such programs have eliminated
reverse discrimination suits against their admissions programs be-
cause considerations of race have been eliminated.254 Also, inno-
cent people who were forced to carry the burdens of past
affirmative action programs are no longer carrying such a bur-
den.2 55 It has taken nearly thirty years to resolve the problem of
248 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1998)
(As the courts continue to move toward a universal and balanced interpretation of
Bakke, states have begun to adopt statutes prohibiting affirmative action, effec-
tively outlawing any unconstitutional preferences for minorities.).
249 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (The equality guarantee
of the Equal Protection Clause states "[t]he law which operates upon one man
shall operate equally upon all."). See also James Traub, The Class of Prop. 209,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 2, 1999 at 2 (describing how the ban on affirmative action
has forced state universities in California to implement outreach programs,
whereby, millions of dollars are contributed to high schools, junior high schools
and elementary schools with a record of educational disadvantage to students).
250 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1998).
251 See Traub, supra note 249, at 16 ("And so the admissions department tried
something new. It distributed to readers a detailed profile of an applicant's high
school, so that the reader could award greater weight to a student who succeeded
despite attending a substandard school-who had, in effect, overcome educational
rather than socioeconomic disadvantage. It suggested that readers consider S.A.T.
scores "in light of each applicant's history and circumstances. And the new
formula appears to have worked, increasing the fraction of minority students in the
admitted pool to 13 percent.").
252 See Gottlieb, supra note 2 (While Rutgers Law School-Newark is now less
likely to encounter reverse discrimination lawsuits, the applicants are now all re-
viewed without the consideration of race.).
253 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (The equality guarantee
of the Equal Protection Clause states "[t]he law which operates upon one man
shall operate equally upon all.").
254 See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
255 See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
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race in admissions programs; however, each step in the process has
been a necessary building block to a solution that is an embodiment
of the true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
256
Saverio Cereste
256 See Roger Clegg, Less Preferred: The Legal Establishment's Embrace of
'Diversity' Amounts to Little More Than a Willingness to Racially Discriminate, 159
N.J.L.J. 407 (Jan. 31, 2000) ("There is nothing wrong with diversity when it occurs
without discrimination, but there is everything wrong with using discrimination to
achieve diversity.").
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